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DLD-170

NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 18-3224
___________
COREY BRACEY,
Appellant
v.

HUNTINGDON COUNTY; JUDGE STEWART L. KURTZ; ADAM PARK; TRAVIS
S. ANDERSON; DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS
____________________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civil Action No. 1-14-cv-02271)
District Judge: Honorable Malachy E. Mannion
____________________________________
Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) or
Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6
April 25, 2019
Before: JORDAN, GREENAWAY, JR., and NYGAARD, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: August 20, 2019)
_________
OPINION*
_________
PER CURIAM

*

This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not
constitute binding precedent.

Pro se appellant Corey Bracey appeals from the District Court’s order granting
summary judgment in favor of several defendants in an action that Bracey brought
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Pennsylvania state law. For the reasons discussed
below, we will summarily affirm.
I.
Because we write primarily for the parties, we will recite only the facts necessary
for our discussion. Bracey, a Pennsylvania state prisoner, was formerly incarcerated at
SCI Huntingdon. On November 17, 2012, Corrections Officer Adam Park suffered a
wound during an altercation between Bracey and SCI Huntingdon prison staff, and feared
that he had been exposed to Bracey’s blood. That same day, a physician examined Park
and determined that a significant exposure had occurred. Two days later, SCI
Huntingdon staff requested Bracey’s consent to undergo HIV and hepatitis testing. He
refused, and again refused the next day.
Lacking Bracey’s consent, the Department of Corrections (DOC)—represented by
Assistant Counsel Travis S. Anderson—filed a lawsuit in the Huntingdon County Court
of Common Pleas on November 20, 2012. The lawsuit sought to compel Bracey to give
blood for purposes of HIV and hepatitis testing pursuant to Pennsylvania’s
Confidentiality of HIV-Related Information Act (“HIV Act”), 35 Pa. Stat. §§ 7601-12.
Judge Stewart L. Kurtz presided over the case and held a hearing on November 26, 2012,
at which Park, a doctor, and a nurse testified on behalf of the DOC. Bracey represented
himself and cross-examined those witnesses. Bracey decided not to testify after he was
informed that his testimony could be used against him in any criminal proceedings
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stemming from the altercation with Park. At the conclusion of the hearing, Judge Kurtz
ruled in the DOC’s favor and ordered Bracey to submit to a blood draw for HIV and
hepatitis testing. Judge Kurtz denied Bracey’s request for a stay pending appeal. Bracey
was then transported back to SCI Huntingdon, where he was restrained and a blood
sample was taken. The test results came back negative for HIV and hepatitis.
In his amended complaint, Bracey alleged that the defendants violated his
constitutional rights and state law when they sought, authorized, or condoned the
involuntary extraction of his blood for HIV and hepatitis testing. Bracey named as
defendants the DOC, Park, Anderson, Judge Kurtz, and Huntingdon County. The District
Court granted the defendants’ motions to dismiss. On appeal, we vacated the District
Court’s order as to defendants Park, Anderson, and the DOC, and we remanded for
further proceedings. See Bracey v. Huntingdon County, 699 F. App’x 114, 117 (3d Cir.
2017) (per curiam) (non-precedential). The District Court then dismissed the claims
against the DOC on alternative grounds,1 but permitted the claims against Park and
Anderson to proceed.
After discovery, the District Court entered summary judgment in favor of the
remaining defendants on Bracey’s federal claims. The District Court dismissed the
remaining state law claims without prejudice. This appeal ensued.

1

As the District Court properly determined that the DOC was immune from suit under
the Eleventh Amendment, see Lavia v. Pa. Dep’t of Corr., 224 F.3d 190, 195 (3d Cir.
2000), we do not discuss this issue further.
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II.
We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We exercise plenary review over
the District Court’s order granting summary judgment. See Blunt v. Lower Merion Sch.
Dist., 767 F.3d 247, 265 (3d Cir. 2014). Summary judgment is proper when, viewing the
evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and drawing all inferences in
favor of that party, there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the moving
party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); Kaucher v. County
of Bucks, 455 F.3d 418, 422-23 (3d Cir. 2006). We may summarily affirm “on any basis
supported by the record” if the appeal fails to present a substantial question. See Murray
v. Bledsoe, 650 F.3d 246, 247 (3d Cir. 2011) (per curiam); Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and
I.O.P. 10.6.
III.
The District Court properly determined that the remaining defendants were
entitled to summary judgment on Bracey’s federal abuse-of-process claim.2 To the extent
that such a claim remains viable, see Halsey v. Pfeiffer, 750 F.3d 273, 290 n.14 (3d Cir.
2014), “a plaintiff must show that the defendant used legal process against the plaintiff in
a way that constituted a perversion of that process,” meaning it was used “primarily to
accomplish a purpose for which the process was not designed,” Gen. Refractories Co. v.

2

Bracey also raised this as a state law claim, and he raised other state law claims as well.
Because the District Court properly disposed of all the federal claims in this case, the
District Court was well within its discretion to dismiss without prejudice the remaining
state law claims. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3); Hedges v. Musco, 204 F.3d 109, 123 (3d
Cir. 2000).
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Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co., 337 F.3d 297, 304 (3d Cir. 2003) (quotation marks and citations
omitted); see also McArdle v. Tronetti, 961 F.2d 1083, 1088 (3d Cir. 1992) (holding that
“a claim of malicious use of process may state a Section 1983 claim if it includes the
elements of that common law tort as it has developed”).
Here, Bracey did not dispute that the HIV Act expressly permitted the defendants
to obtain a court order requiring him to submit to an involuntary blood draw for HIV
testing, and requiring the disclosure of the results to the defendants. See 35 Pa. Stat.
§ 7608(b); see also In re Milton S. Hershey Med. Ctr. of Pa. State Univ., 634 A.2d 159,
161-62 (Pa. 1993). Bracey also conceded that the DOC routinely relies on other legal
authority to involuntarily treat and test inmates, and that the defendants could have relied
on that authority to require the testing of Bracey’s blood for hepatitis. See, e.g., Hill v.
Dep’t of Corr., 992 A.2d 933, 938 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2012) (affirming an injunction
“authoriz[ing] DOC to involuntarily examine and perform invasive diagnostic tests on
[inmate] including blood and urine tests”). Nonetheless, Bracey raised an abuse-ofprocess claim based on the fact that the defendants proceeded under the HIV Act and
failed to cite the legal authorities that would have supported their right to test Bracey’s
blood for hepatitis. But even assuming that the defendants made a legal error in their
pleading or citations, no evidence in the record suggests that their lawsuit was used
“primarily to accomplish a purpose for which the process was not designed.” Gen.
Refractories Co., 337 F.3d at 304. The record shows that the defendants transparently
sought an order to test Bracey’s blood for hepatitis as well as for HIV, and, again, Bracey
concedes that there was a valid legal basis for the state court to enter such an order.
5

Under these circumstances, the remaining defendants were entitled to summary judgment
on the federal abuse-of-process claim.
The remaining defendants were also entitled to summary judgment on the
remaining federal claims. Bracey was afforded notice and a pre-deprivation hearing
where he had the opportunity to testify and to cross-examine witnesses, and he conceded
that state law entitled the defendants to test his blood for hepatitis. See Mathews v.
Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976) (“The fundamental requirement of due process is the
opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.”) (quotation
marks and citations omitted). Furthermore, he has provided no evidence that the state
court proceeding under the HIV Act was inadequate to protect any procedural due
process right. See Revell v. Port Auth. of N.Y. & N.J., 598 F.3d 128, 139 (3d Cir. 2010)
(granting summary judgment on procedural due process claim where plaintiff “failed to
explain” why state’s procedures were inadequate).
Similarly, the remaining defendants were entitled to summary judgment on
Bracey’s substantive due process claims because he presented no evidence that the
defendants’ proceeding under the HIV Act deprived him of any constitutionally protected
interest in a manner that “shocks the conscience.” See Chainey v. Street, 523 F.3d 200,
219 (3d Cir. 2008); cf. Hedges, 204 F.3d at 120 (noting that the “Supreme Court has
upheld the use of blood[] tests in a multitude of cases”). To the extent that Bracey’s
substantive due process claim relies on Doe v. Delie, 257 F.3d 309 (3d Cir. 2001), where
we held that under the Fourteenth Amendment a “constitutional right to privacy in one’s
medical information exists in prison,” Doe also held that the right “may be curtailed by a
6

policy or regulation that is shown to be ‘reasonably related to legitimate penological
interests.’” Id. at 317 (quoting Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987)). Because
Bracey conceded that the defendants had a legal right to disclose the medical information
at issue here, and because Bracey presented no evidence that the defendants’ limited
disclosure—pursuant to state law and a court order—was in any way unrelated to
legitimate state interests, the remaining defendants were entitled to summary judgment on
this claim.3
For the foregoing reasons, we will summarily affirm the District Court’s
judgment. See 3d Cir. L.A.R. 27.4; I.O.P. 10.6.

3

Even assuming that Bracey did not abandon his Fourth Amendment claim, the evidence
is insufficient to support a finding that he was subjected to an unreasonable search or
seizure, as he was afforded procedural protections under state law and the HIV Act. See
United States v. Ward, 131 F.3d 335, 341 (3d Cir. 1997) (“In light of the extensive
protections afforded by the [Violence Against Women] Act, there can be no doubt that a
blood test under its authority for the limited purpose of ascertaining the presence of HIV
complies with the Fourth Amendment.”); see also Hamilton v. Brown, 630 F.3d 889, 894
(9th Cir. 2011) (collecting cases). Thus, the remaining defendants were also entitled to
summary judgment on this claim.
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